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1. INTRODUCTION
During an SBO accident, the initiating event is a loss
of Class IV and Class III power, causing the loss of the
pumps used in systems such as PHTS, moderator cooling,
shield cooling, steam generator feed water, and re-circulating
cooling water. The reference case of SBO does not credit
any of these active heat sinks, but only relies on the passive
heat sinks, particularly the initial water inventories of the
PHTS, moderator, steam generator secondary side, end
shields, and reactor vault. The reference analysis is followed
by a series of sensitivity cases assuming certain system
availabilities, in order to assess their mitigating effects.
This paper also establishes the strategies to mitigate SBO
accidents. Current studies and strategies use the computer
code of the ISAAC for Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant Unit
#1 (WSNPP-1)
The ISAAC[1] computer code provides a flexible,
efficient, integrated tool for evaluating the in-plant effects
of a wide range of postulated accidents and for examining
the impact of operator actions on accident progressions. The
generic models of ISAAC evolved from the MAAP4 code
developed by Fauske and Associates (FAI), for pressurized
and boiling light water reactors. Some of these models
required minor modifications to adapt them to CANDU-6
design features and to be integrated with the rest of the code,
but fundamentally these models were unchanged from
the generic MAAP4 models. 
2. CANDU-6 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND
MODELLING
The WSNPP-1 is CANDU-6 Pressurized Heavy Water
Reactors (PHWRs). They have 380 horizontal fuel channels
surrounded by a cool low-pressure heavy water moderator.
Each fuel channel contains twelve fuel bundles within a
pressure tube [2]. One bundle consists of 37 elements that
contain natural uranium in the form of compacted sintered
cylindrical pellets of uranium dioxide (UO2). Each channel
has an end fitting at each end, which allows the fueling
machines to attach and facilitate power refueling. The
coolant enters the channel from an inlet feeder pipe , con-
nected to the inlet end fitting. the coolant enters the fuel
string, flowing within the channels between the fuel elements
inside the pressure tube. The coolant leaves the channel
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via an outlet feeder pipe that is attached to the outlet end
fitting. It enters the channel at approximately 11 MPa and
263 °C; and leaves slightly above 10 MPa and 310 °C.
Figure 1 shows a simplified overview of the PHTS. The
core is subdivided into two symmetrically located figures
in two loops. Each loop consists of two core passes of 95
channels each. The core has 380 fuel channels arranged
in 22 rows and 22 columns. 
ISAAC is constructed in modules covering individual
regions within the plant: PHTS, pressurizer, steam generator
(SG), calandria, reactor vault (RV), end shields, degasser
condenser tank (DCT), and reactor building (RB). The code
evaluates a wide spectrum of phenomena including steam
formation, core heat-up, cladding oxidation and hydrogen
evolution, vessel failure, corium-concrete interactions,
ignition of combustible gases, fluid entrainment by high-
velocity gases and fission-product release, transport, and
deposition. Also, the important engineered safety systems
and operator interventions to mitigate the accident progres-
sion are modelled.
The ISAAC input for each loop is described as follows.
The three horizontal channels consider the channel power
distributions of high, medium, and low at the same
elevation. The channel power distribution at WSNPP-1 is
shown in Figure 2[3]. 
The initiating event is a loss of Class IV and Class III
power, the LRVs fail to open and the steam and water flow
into DCT. It also causes a loss of pumps used in systems
such as the PHTS, moderator cooling, shield cooling, steam
generator feed water, and re-circulating cooling water.
Though any active heat sinks are not credited, the accident
progression could be delayed thanks to the passive heat
sinks, particularly the initial water inventories of the PHTS,
moderator, steam generator secondary side, end shields and
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Fig. 2. Suspended Debris Bed Locations Defined for 9+9 Type Fuel Channels in ISAAC WSNPP-1.
Fig. 1. CANDU-6 Simplified Circuit Diagram.
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reactor vault. The steam generator atmospherics steam
discharge valves (ASDVs), condenser steam discharge
valves (CSDVs) are assumed fail open. We also did not
credit the feed and bleed system, pressurizer heater and
pressurizer steam discharge valve.
3. THE ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE REFERENCE
CASE
For the analysis of the reference case of SBO, the sce-
nario is considered as a transient, initiated by a loss of off-
site AC (Class IV) power, with the subsequent loss of all
on-site standby and emergency electric power supplies. If
the high pressure, medium pressure and the low pressure
emergency core cooling, crash-cooling function, shut-down
cooling and shield cooling systems are not available, the
accident sequence can result in  severe core damage. The
PHTS loops are notisolated from each other, and the local
air coolers and operator intervention are assumed to be
unavailable. The input data of the ISAAC code for the
reference case is shown in Table 1 and the results of signifi-
cant event sequences are summarized in Table 2 [4]. Due
to program limitations, the ISAAC can not apply actual
plant operating condition. For example, the actual temper-
ature of reactor inlet header is 263 °C(536K), but ISAAC,
uses one input as the inlet and outlet header temperature
(583K) 
Table 1. Key Input Parameters for WSNPP-1
Parameter Value
Total fission power, MWth
ROH normal operating pressure, MPa (a)
Steam generator operating pressure, MPa (a)
RIH/ROH coolant temperature, K
Water temperature at steam generator secondary side, K
Moderator temperature in calandria vessel, K (average)
Water temperature in reactor vault, K (average)
Uranium dioxide mass in the core, kg
Zircaloy mass in the core (including pressure and calandria tubes), kg
H2O inventory (simulating an equivalent volume of D2O) in PHTS (w/o pressurizer), kg
H2O inventory (simulating an equivalent volume of D2O) in pressurizer, kg
H2O inventory (simulating an equivalent volume of D2O) in calandria vessel, kg
H2O inventory in reactor vault, kg
H2O inventory in each steam generator secondary side, kg
Dousing inventory available for RB spray, m3
Pressure to open reactor vault rupture disk, kPa (d) (psig)
Pressure to open calandria vessel rupture disk, kPa (d) (psig)
Design pressure to start dousing operation, kPa (a) 
Design pressure to terminate dousing operation, kPa (a)
Free volume space inside RB (assuming that the dousing tank is empty), m3
Thickness of the calandria vessel circumferential wall, m
Flow area of reactor vault rupture disc, m2
Passive autocatalytic recombiners, number (large: 2, medium: 15, small: 10)
Start/ Stop hydrogen concentration, %
Delay time, first PAR operation, sec
2157.5
10.0
4.69
583
533
330.4
327.2
98,815.2
42,734.8
89,500
23,400
229,810
517,900
37,734
2056
68.9 (10)
138 (20)
115.1
108.2
51,500
0.0286
0.0365
27
2.0/0.2
1,800
3.1  PHTS/SG Response
Since the PHTS pumps are not available due to a loss
of power, the fuel heats up and the decay heat is transferred
to the heavy water coolant. A temperature gradient develops
between the coolant in the core and the steam generator
region, which promotes natural circulation between the two
regions. The decay heat is transferred to the secondary
side of the steam generators, which results in a decrease
in the PHTS pressure. At this point, the secondary side of
the steam generators has sufficient heat sink capacity to
absorb the decay heat. Figure 3 shows the pressure behavior
in the PHTS loops and in the pressurizer. As expected,
both loops show similar behavior. 
The heat transfer from the PHTS to the steam generators
causes the water in the steam generators secondary side
to boil off. As a result, the pressure in the secondary side
of the steam generators increases gradually and causes the
Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) to open and to discharge
steam from the secondary side to the environment outside
the reactor building. The secondary side steam generator
pressure then oscillates at the MSSV set point as the safety
valves open and close. The water level in the steam genera-
tors decreases, as boil-off proceeds (Figure 4). When water
in the steam generators is depleted at about 10,100 s, the
steam generators dry out and are no longer a heat sink to
remove heat from the PHTS. Thus, the pressure in the
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Table 2. Sequence of Significant Events for the Reference case of Station Blackout Scenario
Time hours Events
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.4 
1.0 
1.2 
1.2 
7.3 
8.9 
10.3 
39.5 
114.5 
seconds
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
11/20
248
1,400
3,632
4,377
4,377
26,130
32,070
37,000
142,100
412,156
Loss of AC power
Reactor scram due to loss of class IV power
Steam Generator (SG) main/auxiliary feed water off
PHTS pump trip
Moderator cooling off
Shield cooling off
Local air cooler off
High Pressure/Middle Pressure /Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling System off
Dousing spray signal received
Liquid relief valve opened (loop 1/loop 2)
Dousing tank water depleted for dousing sprays
At least one SG 2ry side dryout
At least one core loop uncovered
At least one pressure tube ruptured 
Calandria vessel rupture disk first open
Reactor building failed
Calandria vessel dryout
Reactor vault water pool saturated
Calandria vessel failed
Reactor vault failed due to concrete erosion
Fig. 3. PHTS(Loop 1 :PPS(1), Loop 2: PPS(2))/PZR(PPZ)
Pressures for Reference Case(Pa)
PHTS starts to increase until it reaches the PHTS liquid
relief valve (LRV) set point, 10.16 MPa (a), and fails open
resulting in inventory discharge into DCT. The PHTS
inventory is lost through the LRVs and the fuel bundles
begin to uncover within the pressure tube
3.2 Core Response
The PHTS inventory is gradually lost through the
LRVs resulting in fuel channel dry-out. In parallel, the
moderator heats up and the water level in the calandria
vessel decreases gradually since moderator cooling is not
assumed to be available. With the loss of moderator as a
heat sink, a lead channel with the highest decay power and
the smallest inventory in each loop, which is situated at a
high elevation in the calandria vessel, reaches pressures
and temperatures unsustainably high for the lead channel,
leading to the rupture of the lead channel. With the rupture
of the lead channel, the PHTS pressure drops rapidly to
about 14,300 s and the loop inventory is blown down into
the calandria vessel. With the rapid blow down of the PHTS
inventory into the calandria vessel, the pressure inside the
calandria vessel reaches the set point of the rupture disc
and the calandria vessel rupture discs burst. Temperatures
of pressure/calandria tubes, as well as that of the central
fuel ring for a selected channel are presented in Figure 5.
Figure 5 also shows that the Pressurizer tube (PT), calandria
tube (CT) and fuel temperatures remain constant up to about
14,000 s for the 7.1.1 fuel node. 
With the loss of the moderator inventory surrounding
the fuel channels and as a result of the exothermic zirco-
nium-steam reaction, which generates hydrogen, the fuel
channel temperature increases. The fuel channels on the
top rows heat up and sag under gravity. The top row of
channels sags and contacts the next row of the lower uncov-
ered channel and transfers the load and heat. During the
sagging process the longitudinal total strain of the fuel
channel increases. The total strain will concentrate between
the fuel bundle junctions as the sagging increases and lead
to wall-thinning at the junction region between the fuel
bundles. The CT will perforate as a result, which will allow
steam to enter the gap between the pressure tube and the
CT. The fresh zircaloy surfaces in the gap between the
pressure tube and the CTs are exposed to steam and as a
result the fuel channel temperatures will rapidly increase
from the zircaloy-steam exothermic reaction and produce
hydrogen. 
The broken channels accumulate to form a porous ‘sus-
pended debris bed’ on the stronger and colder channels
underneath, which are immersed in the moderator. The
suspended debris mass builds up with time and as the calan-
dria vessel (CV) inventory decreases the debris continues
to produce hydrogen and release fission products stemming
from their exposure to steam. As the debris mass increases
steam access to the interior of the debris, mass becomes
more difficult and hydrogen and fission products are released
into the reactor building through the CV rupture discs. Since
the CV is immersed in the reactor vault water, the radio-
active heat from the suspended debris bed is absorbed by
the colder CV wall. However, some molten material is
expected to be formed from the U02-Zr eutectic reactions
within the suspended debris bed, which will gradually
relocate into the moderator below. During this quenching
process the molten corium interacts with the water (Molten
Corium Interaction (MCI)) and small-size particulate debris
will be formed, which will relocate to the bottom of the
CV (Figure 6) to become part of the terminal debris bed
and coat the vessel wall to subsequently become part of the
crust. Solid debris can also relocate from higher elevations
of the core region to lower elevations within the suspended
debris bed, when space is available to accommodate them.
As the accident progresses and the CV inventory de-
crease, more and more debris accumulate on the colder
supporting fuel channels immersed in the remaining water.
The supporting channels have a limited load-bearing ca-
pacity to support the debris load. When the load on the
supporting channels exceeds a critical value the supporting
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Fig. 4. SG#1~4 Water Level for for Reference Case (m)
Fig. 5. Fuel/pressure Tube/calandria Tube Temperatures in
Fuel Node (7,1,1) for for Reference Case (K)
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channels will fail at the CT/tube sheet rolled joint. The
suspended debris bed including the supporting channels
and the channels below in the remaining moderator will
collapse and fall into the moderator, where the debris will
be quenched. The phenomenon of rapid debris relocation
into the CVbottom by this process is called ‘Core Collapse’.
When the suspended debris bed mass exceeds the user-
specified value, as described above, the core material in the
suspended bed and most of the intact channels relocate to
the bottom of the CV at about 57,500 s. The reactor vault
water would still be below the saturation temperature and
continue to keep the CV wall cool. The resulting terminal
debris bed will be initially porous and will be covered with
the residual water in the CV. The terminal debris bed at the
bottom will contain fuel channel debris containing oxidized
segments of PT, CT, UO2 and a small quantity of frag-
mented Zr-U-O material, which relocated from the sus-
pended debris as molten material from UO2-Zr interaction.
3.3 Calandria Response
A significant quantity of the moderator inventory is
discharged into the reactor building when the fuel channels
rupture pressurizes the CV. Several top fuel channel rows
are uncovered during this process. After the initial rapid
moderator expulsion, the moderator continues to discharge
gradually into the reactor building as a result of the continued
moderator boil off due to the heat transfer from the core.
The moderator temperature and pressure in the CV increase
as a result of the loss of moderator cooling and heat transfer
from the core. The moderator in the CV reaches the satura-
tion temperature at about 14,290 s. At this time, the pressure
inside the CV reaches 238 kPa(a), which is the set point
of the rupture disk (Figure 7). As a result, the rupture disk
fails and the moderator is lost through the relief ducts
(Figures 8).
Following core material relocation, the remaining water
in the CV eventually boils off releasing hydrogen and
fission products if the water is not replenished: the debris
will form a compacted terminal bed. Figure 9 shows the
behavior of the corium mass composition in the CV. The
hydrogen reaction will cease once  all of the steam in the
CV is used up by the zircaloy-steam reaction. The com-
pacted terminal debris bed inside the CV is still surrounded
Fig. 6. Corium Mass Behavior in Loops and CV(MCMTCT)
for for Reference Case (kg)
Fig. 7. Pressure in Calandria Vessel for for Reference Case (Pa)
Fig. 8. Water level in Calandria Vessel for for Reference Case (m)
Fig. 9. Corium Mass Composition in Calandria Vessel for for
Reference Case (kg)
by water in the reactor vault, which will keep the outer
layers of the terminal debris bed facing the reactor vault at
a cool temperrature. With the absence of in-vessel cooling
assumed here, the core debris will begin to melt near the
top of the terminal debris bed. The top layers of the com-
pacting debris bed will radiate heat to the colder top CV
walls and will form a crust on the top surface. The melting
process will generate a U/Z/O alloy, called corium, which
will gradually spread from the center region of the terminal
debris bed outwards and penetrate the solid debris surround-
ing the molten corium. due to high heat transfer from the
CV wall to the reactor vault water the molten material will
eventually solidify. The molten corium pool is surrounded
on all sides by the crust. As long as the critical heat flux
at the CV wall/reactor vault interface is not exceeded, the
solid crust, insulating like a crucible, will be in place and
will contain the molten corium inside the CV. The corium
will be maintained inside the CV by this in-vessel retention
strategy.
The moderator inside the CV is depleted at about 43,800
s; therefore, no steam source is available to cause a pressure
increase. The water in the RV acts as a heat sink to cool
the external CV wall. Steam generated in the CV is released
from the reactor vault into the reactor building. The water
level in the RV reaches the CV bottom at about 157,000
s (Figure 10). Thus, the CV bottom heats up rapidly from
the heat generated by the core debris inside, and the CV
fails due to creep. When the CV fails, the debris relocates
into the RV, where it is cooled by the water.
3.4  Reactor Vault Response
The pressure and water levels in the RV and end shields
increase gradually after the initiating event. This behavior
is caused by the loss of shield and moderator cooling and
by heat transfer from the core to the moderator and the end
shield. The reactor vault and end shield have combined vent
lines, and two rupture disks are connected to the combined
vent lines to relieve over-pressure caused by boiling of
the reactor vault and end-shield water. At about 14,300 s,
the rupture discs burst and steam is discharged from the
end shields to the reactor building. Water in the reactor
vault begins to boil off at about 60,000 s resulting in a
gradual decrease of the reactor vault water level.
At about 156,840 s, the CV bottom fails and corium in
the CV relocates into the reactor vault floor. Eventually,
all water in the RV dries out at about 175,000 s. The corium
then reacts with the concrete floor. When the eroded depth
of the concrete reaches 2 m, the concrete floor of the RV
is considered failed at about 434,000 s (Figure 11). Follow-
ing the reactor vault failure, the corium interacts with the
water in the basement.
3.5  Reactor Building (RB) Response
Figure 12 shows the pressure in the reactor building
node representing the steam generator room. After accident
initiation, the reactor building pressure gradually increases,
since water is discharged into the reactor building through
the PHTS LRVs. The rapid increase (or decrease) of reactor
building pressure as shown in Figure 12 at the approximate
times of 14,300 s, 74,300 s, 156,800 s, and 434,000 s can
be explained by the following processes, which occur at
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Fig. 10. Water level in Reactor Vault for for Reference Case (m)
Fig. 11. Concrete Ablation Thickness for for Reference Case (m) 
Fig. 12. Pressure Behavior in SG Room for for Reference Case (Pa)
those respective times: (1) rupture of PT and CT, (2) reactor
building failure, (3) CV failure and corium relocation into
the reactor vault and (4) corium relocation into the basement
after RV failure. As mentioned above, at about 60,000 s,
water in the RV reaches the saturation temperature and
begins to boil off, thus gradually increasing the reactor
building pressure. At about 74,300 s, the reactor building
pressure reaches the failure set point of 426 kPa(a), resulting
in reactor building failure. 
3.6  Hydrogen Behaviour
During the reference case of SBO sequence, hydrogen
is generated as a result of the following reactions: (1) Zr-
steam reaction in the fuel channels and in the suspended
debris beds during core debris oxidation and (2) molten
core-concrete interaction. The results show that the mass
of hydrogen generated in the PHTS and CV is about 642
kg prior to CV failure, and is about 2,880 kg as a result
of molten corium-concrete interaction in the reactor vault
(Figure 13). Figure 14 represents a total mass of hydrogen
removed by PARs, which reaches to about 355 kg.
4. MITIGATION STRATEGY SIMULATION
The results of the reference case of SBO show that the
RB fails at approximately 20.6 hours after the accident
initiation and the calandria fails at 43.6 hours. Severe core
damage began at 1.2 hours and the RB failed at 7.3 hours.
Therefore, the symptoms of the SBO processes could be
understood. The following analysis cases reflect SBO
counter actions. The venting strategy is also modeled at
300 kPa (d) for the RB integrity.
4.1 Case 1   
The heat transfer from the PHTS to the steam generators
causes the water in the steam generator secondary side to
boil off. As a result, the pressure in the secondary side of
the steam generators gradually increases and causes the
MSSVs to open and discharge steam from the secondary
side to the environment outside the RB. The water level
in the steam generators decreases as the boil off proceeds.
When the water in the steam generators is depleted at
approximately 10,100 s, the steam generators dry out and
are no longer a heat sink that can remove heat from the
PHTS. The PHTS inventory is lost through the LRVs and
the fuel bundles start to be uncovered within the pressure
tubes. The PHTS inventory is gradually lost through the
LRVs resulting in the fuel channel dry-out. In parallel, the
moderator heats up and the water level in the calandria
vessel gradually decreases since the moderator cooling is
assumed to be unavailable. With the loss of the moderator
as a heat sink, the lead channel with the highest decay power
and the smallest inventory in each loop, which has a high
elevation in the calandria vessel, reaches high pressures
and temperatures such that the lead channel will be unable
to sustain the pressures. As a result, the lead channel rup-
tures. With the rupture of the lead channel, the PHTS pres-
sure drops rapidly at approximately 14,315 s, and the loop
inventory is blown down into the CV. With the rapid blow
down of the PHTS inventory into the CV, the pressure
inside the CV reaches the set point of the rupture disc and
the CV rupture discs burst. 
After an SBO at 5 hours, the dousing water (total ca-
pacity of 2,056 m3 of water) is taken to the SG through
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Fig. 13. Hydrogen Mass Generated from Core and MCCI for
for Reference Case (kg)
Fig. 14. Total mass of Hydrogen Removed from PARs for for
Reference Case (kg)
Makeup from
Dousing to SG 
Moderator
Makeup
LAC RB Vent
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
5 hr
2 hr
2 hr
2 hr
5 hr
No
No
24 hr
No
No
48 hr
48 hr
> 300 
kPa (d)   
Table 3. Mitigating Analysis Cases for SBO
PV 7/41. The moderator makeup is also taken at the same
time. The highest sheath temperature at each node is ap-
proximately 2,000 K and this is described in Figure 15.
Here, the fuel channel breakup occurred at 14,315 s (~4
hrs), but there was no molten corium. After the accident
initiation, the RB pressure gradually increases because
water and steam are discharged into the RB through the
PHTS LRVs. Figure 16 shows the pressure in the RB node
representing the steam generator room . Figure 17 shows
that the mass of hydrogen generated in the PHTS and
calandria vessel is approximately 0.65% in Case 1.
4.2 Case 2 
Based on Case 1 and the reference case studies, the time
of the channel breakup was found. For this case, the makeup
with the dousing water to SG through PV 7/41 was made
within 2 hours and the moderator makeup and LAC were
not taken. The key results are described at Table 4. Here,
a 66 hr delay was found when compared with Case 1 at
the channel breakup time, but the molten corium and RB
vent exist and are required at the moderator makeup and
LAC within 3 days and 4 days after the SBO. Without the
moderator makeup, core melting cannot be prevented.  
4.3 Case 3 
This case study was undertaken in order to understand
the effectiveness of the LAC; if the LAC can be used,
venting of the RB is not required.
4.4 Case 4
Based on the studies of Cases 1, 2, and 3, a strategy
where the makeup from the dousing to the SG occurred
within 2 hours, the moderator makeup occurred within
24 hours, and the LAC was available within 48 hours was
established. Figure 18 shows the highest sheath temperature
at each node. The highest sheath temperature is approxi-
mately 1,420 K and the fuel channel breakup occurred at
310,828 s (~3.6 days), but there was no corium. Figure 19
shows the pressure in the RB node representing the steam
generator room . Figure 20 shows that the mass of hydrogen
generated in the PHTS and calandria vessel was approxi-
mately 0.83% of hydrogen concentration.
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Fig. 15. Fuel Sheath Peak Temperature (Loop 1 :TCRHOT(1),
Loop2 : TCRHOT(2)) Trend in Case 1 (K).
Fig. 16. RB Pressure Trend in Case 1 (Pa).
Table 4. Summary of Results
Hydrogen
Concentration (%)
Moderator
Level (s)
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
14,315 (~4 hr)
253,487 (~2.9 d)
268,008 (~3.1 d)
310,858 (~3.6 d)
0.65
0.59
0.33
0.83
Maintain after a small drain
Drain 303,072 (~3.5 d)
Drain 308,737 (~3.6 d)
Maintain after a small drain
Corium
Present (s)
No
259,732 (~3 d)
276,751 (~3.2 d)
No
Vent or Peak Pressure
of RB
546,640 s (~6.3 d)
355,123 s (~4.1 d)
170 kPa (d)
50 kPa (d)
Channel Breakup (s)
Fig. 17. Hydrogen Concentration in Case 1
5. RESULTS
The results demonstrate that the reference case of SBO,
these results are used to understand the severe accident
progression for various cases and to update the current docu-
ments related to severe accidents including the PSA reports
and severe accident management guidelines (SAMG).
If the strategy of the dousing water to SG occurs within
2 hours, the moderator makeup within 24 hours, and the
LAC is available within 48 hours can be implemented, the
fuel breakup will be delayed by 3.6 days and there is no
molten corium. If the LAC is not available, venting must
occur within 4 days. As a result of Case 4, the best process
is using dousing water to SG within 2 hours, the moderator
makeup within 24 hours, and the LAC being available
within 48 hours. 
6. CONCLUSION
The simulations were performed using the severe acci-
dent analysis code of ISAAC 4.03 and a WSNPP-1 specific
parameter file. All results will be used to understand the
severe accident progression for various cases and to update
the current severe accident related documents including the
PSA reports and severe accident management guidelines
(SAMG).
If the dousing water to SG can occur within 2 hours,
the moderator makeup within 24 hours, and the LAC be-
comes available within 48 hours, the integrity of the RB can
be maintained and a value lower than 0.83% of hydrogen
can be obtained. The highest sheath temperature was ap-
proximately 1,420 K and the fuel channel breakup occurred
at 310,828 s (~3.6 days), but there was no molten corium. 
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Fig. 19. RB Pressure Trend in Case 4 (Pa).
Fig. 20. Hydrogen Concentration in Case 4.
Fig. 18. Fuel Sheath Peak Temperature (Loop 1 :TCRHOT(1),
Loop2 : TCRHOT(2))  in Case 4 (K).
